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AB�'TRACT 
The revelation principle in welfare economics asserts 
that, in principle, the allocative performance of direct 
mechanisms (institutions in which an exhaustive report of 
privately held information is elicited from each agent) is at 
least as good as that of any other class of institutions. 
Recently it has been suggested that direct mechanisms may be of 
practical as well as theoretical importance, although in practice 
agents would supply only summary information. The distinction 
between the incentive properties of exhaustive and summary 
reporting is studied here. The problem of inducing a single 
person truthfully to report the value of a continuous 
multidimensional parameter is examined. It is shown that, unless 
strong restrictions are placed on the person's utility function, 
the incentive properties of truthful summary reporting about the 
parameter (e.g., reporting of its first coordinate) are extremely 
fragile. This assertion of fragility is given a precise statement 
in terms of topological notions. 
DECEN1Tu\LIZABILITY OF TRUTHFUL REVELATION AND 
OTHER DECISION RULE'S* 
1 • IN'IRODUCTION 
Edward J. Green 
California Institute of Technology 
An outstanding accomplishment of welfare economics of the past 
several decades has been the development of a systematic approach to 
problems of incentives in environments where persons have private 
information. One of the central insights upon which this approach is 
based is that the theoretical analysis of the economic role of 
information can be accomplished without having to examine case by case 
the bewildering variety of actual or possible economic institutions. 
Rather. results established with reference to a special class of 
institutions called direct mechanisms are in fact completely general. 
It is not necessarily supposed that any direct mechanisms have ever 
been observed in actual economic life; only the theoretical assertion 
is made that institutions of this form exist which in principle would 
duplicate the performance of actual ones. Direct mechanisms work by 
eliciting from each person an exhaustive report concerning his private 
information. and by defining an allocation on the basis of these 
reports. The private information held by the various persons, taken 
together, is called the .!..l!!.l· 
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The assertion that direct mechanisms exist which provide 
allocations that are as desirable as those provided by other 
institutions is known as the revelation principle. According to this 
principle. if a state-contingent allocation can be achieved as the 
equilibrium outcome of any institution. then it can be achieved as the 
outcome of an institution in which (a) each participant is required to 
give a report of his private information. and (b) for all participants 
to give truthful and complete reports is an equilibrium.1 
Recently it has been suggested that the revelation principle 
may serve as a practical basis for the design of particular 
institutions such as auctions or regulatory procedures. This 
suggestion marks a significant change from viewing direct mechanisms 
as a theoretical construct to viewing them as candidates for actual 
use. It is natural that direct mechanisms should be considered in 
situations where private information is not very complicated or where 
exhaustive reporting of private information is feasible and 
inexpensive. but the use of these mechanisms raises questions in 
situations where these conditions are not satisfied. For instance. it 
is sometimes charged that laws mandating disclosure by firms of 
financial information impose significant costs which are inefficient 
because the detailed accounting information which must be furnished is 
far in excess of what investors require. According t� •�is argument. 
full reporting of firm managers' private information is undesirable 
even though it is feasible, because the cost of this reporting exceeds 
the benefit which is obtainable from it. The argument against 
3 
mandatory financial disclosure continues by suggesting that 
negotiation between firm owners and managers will result in an 
efficient agreement about what information should be reported, and it 
concludes by appealing to the rovolation principle to assort that this 
agreement would be implementable by an appropriately chosen system of 
incentives. 
Regardless of whether the earlier stages of this argument are 
sound, its last step is faulty. While the critics of financial 
disclosure laws assume that the sU1111Uary information needed by 
stockholders will be provided truthfully in its condensed form, the 
revelation principle actually does not guarantee that incentives exist 
which would induce truthful revelation of this summary information. 
The assumption must roly on some implicit premise that the same 
incentives which would induce truthful complete reporting could be 
modified to induce truthful summary reporting instead. The present 
paper deals procisoly with the question of whether this implicit 
premise is warranted. The conclusion will be tentatively negative. 
It will be argued that, unless strong restrictions can be put a priori 
on the preferences of an agent subject to incentives, the provision of 
a schedule of incentives which induce truthful summary reporting is 
practically an impossible task. The following four remarks provide a 
more precise statement of this result and indicate how it is related 
to the revelation principle as usually presented.2 
Remark 1: The revelation principle is formulated in terms of 
a game with several players. Each player �akes a decision which will 
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be best for himself, given the structure of tho game and his 
expectations about what tho other players will do. Tho prosont paper 
concerns tho problem of inducing a single person to give a truthful 
and complete report of his private information. This problem differs 
in two respects from the problem addressed by the revelation 
principle. First, because ono person is considered in isolation, only 
an optimal decision rather than an equilibrium needs to be 
characterized. Second, while the revelation principle asserts that a 
game having specific payoffs in equilibrium (i.e., an allocation in 
every state which is as good for tho players as that provided by the 
game initially considered) must have truthful reporting as an 
equilibrium, this paper asks instead whether there is any system of 
incentives at all which will induce truthful reporting. Despite these 
differences, it seems very likely that the present results will have 
analogues for many-person environments. 
Remark 2: According to the revelation principle, a person is 
considered to have incentive to perform an action in some state of 
nature if the action is among his utility-maximizing actions in that 
state. Thus, if the person's action does not enter directly into his 
utility function (e.g., if it is to send a message rather than to 
perform some arduous task) , simply to give a fixed reward regardless 
of what is done will provide incentives in this weak sense for any 
action. It might further be required that the action chosen in any 
state be the unique utility-maximizing action in that state. When it 
applies simultaneously to all the players in a game, this stronger 
s 
requirement is commonly known as decentralization. Whether truthful 
revelation (and other decision rules or state-contingent actions) can 
be decentralized is the topic of this paper. Because only the 
decision problem of a single person will be studied explicitly here. a 
schedule of rewards will be said to strictly support a decision rule 
if it provides incentives relative to which the rule always specifies 
tho decision maker' s unique best action. 
Remark 3 :  Implicit in the suggestion that tho revelation 
principle might be of practical importance is the idea that a wide 
variety of incentive problems can be solved indirectly by being 
reduced to the canonical problem of inducing truthful revelation. 
However. sufficient conditions for tho canonical problem to have a 
solution (i.e • •  for truthful revelation to be decentralizable) have 
been given only when private information is reproso nted by a state 
space which is either a finite set or a one-dimensional continuum. 
Intuitively. persons' private information in actual situations seems 
more complex than those representations would permit. In the present 
paper. a local version of strict supportability vill be studied for 
decision rules defined on a multidimensional state space. It will be 
asked whether decision rules are locally strictly supportable for a 
class of utility functions comparably general to the class for which 
comparative-statics results hold in price theory. (Technically. are 
they strictly supportable for an open set of utility functions in the 
Whitney CJ- topology?) 
Theorem 1 vill establish that. in many environments, truthful 
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exhaustive revelation and related decision rules have this property. 
Theorem 2 will show further that. in a natural sense. the existence of 
reward schedules which locally strictly support truthful exhaustive 
revelation is a simple consequence of the ability of the reward giver 
to affect differentially the opportunity costs of the person receiving 
incentives for performing various actions (i.e • •  for reporting 
truthfully or for giving various untruthful reports) . and that it does 
not depend on delicate considerations having to do with special 
features of the incentive taker's preferences regarding particular 
rewards or sanctions. These theorems show that the requirement of 
strict supportability (rather than of decentralizability as usually 
formulated) and the restriction of reward schedules to the class of 
smooth functions do not � rulo out the possibility of deriving 
affirmative results about decentralization of decision rules. 
The main result of this paper is Theorem 3 .  This theorem will 
state that. for almost all possible preferences of the incentive taker 
(i.e • •  for a residual set of utility functions in the Whitney CZ.
topology) . the local strict supportability of summary reporting is 
extremely sensitive to the kinds of special considerations which do 
not arise with respect to exhaustive reporting. Taken together. 
Theorems 2 and 3 show that the incentive properties of truthful 
summary reporting are immensely more fragile than are those of 
truthful exhaustive reporting. Interpreted in this vay. Theorem 3 
appears as a strongly negative result which casts severe doubt on the 
informal interpretation of the revelation principle to assert that 
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truthful summary reporting of information can be decentralized. 
The results of this paper are presented in a way which 
emphasizes the complete analogy between incentive problems which 
concern truthful reporting and those which involve other kinds of 
actions. Any smooth decision rule will be seen to be locally 
isomorphic on a dense open set of states either to truthful exhaustive 
reporting, or to truthful summary reporting, or to a rule specifying 
that some particular action should always be taken regardless of the 
state. In light of Theorems 2 and 3, characterization of the local 
incentive properties of constant decision rules suggests itself 
naturally as a problem. Theorem 4 addresses this issue. It will 
state that constant rules share the favorable attributes of truthful 
exhaustive reporting. 
Remark 4: In this paper, the decision maker's preference over 
rewards is described directly rather than derived from some more 
fundamental preference relation. For instance, if the owners of the 
firm were to offer a compensation package involving both salary and 
stock options in order to provide managerial incentives, then the 
manager would be described in terms of a reduced-form utility function 
over combinations of money and stock. In general, such a function 
will not be derivable from maximization of expected utility of the 
stochastic wealth which money-plus-stock: combinations will yield. 
Furthermore, even restrictions such as separability which can be 
placed directly on the utility function for rewards will not be 
considered here. 
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The assumption that the manager maximizes expected utility of 
wealth, or some other a priori restriction on his preferences over the 
rewards which may be provided, might reverse the conclusions which are 
derived here in the absence of restrictions. The present results will 
imply that reporting in full, but not summary reporting, can 
reasonably be expected to be induced by an incentive schedule if no 
special assumptions about utility are made. Thia might be regarded as 
a statement about economic modeling, rather than as a hard fact about 
the world. The point of this paper is to show that parametric 
assumptions which have been made in the literature on incentives, and 
which have been treated as being mere technical conveniences, perhaps 
crucially affect the conclusions that are drawn. The conclusions of 
this literature are not necessarily to be rejected, but tho basis on 
which they rest deserves closer scrutiny than it has so far received. 
2 • AN EXAMPLE 
Before proceeding to the technical results of the paper, the 
intuition which lies behind them will be discussed in terms of an 
example pertaining to the issue of financial disclosure which has 
already been mention in the Introduction. Specifically, we refer to 
the work of Ross [10] on signalling equilibria in stock markets. Ross 
poses the question, is there some action which firm managers can be 
induced to take which will systematically reveal their inside 
information to shareholders? He answers this question affirmatively 
in the context of a partial equilibrium model (i.e., one in which the 
relation between return distributions of different firms is ignored) . 
under the assumption that the distribution of firms' returns belongs 
to a monotone-likelihood family. The assumptions made in this model 
preclude consideration of the relationships between risk and return 
which are of central concern in financial theory. It is fair to 
characterize them as being highly restrictive.3 
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In truth. the market valuation of financial assets seems to be 
quite complicated. Let us consider specifically the pricing of 
equity. One might presume that the annual reports which firm managers 
send to their stockholders contain sufficient information so that 
investors can determine the value of equity at the time the reports 
are released. if that information is provided truthfully. (At least. 
this seems to be what is presumed by some currently popular arguments 
for the redundancy of financial disclosure laws.) However. the annual 
reports contain only a miniscule part of managers' total information 
about the current operations. plans. and forecasts of their firms. 
Thus the single question which can be posed about managerial 
incentives in the context of Ross's simplified model splits into two 
very distinc questions with respect to actual markets. First. it may 
be asked whether the manager of a firm can be induced to give a 
truthful report in full detail of what he knows. Truthful revelation 
in this sense is the goal of the exhaustive reports (such as the lOK 
report in the United States) mandated by disclosure laws. 
Alternatively. it may be asked whether the manager can be induced to 
give a truthful summary report of his private information. That is. 
10 
is it possible to formulate incentives which will lead managers to 
provide accurate information in their annual reports to stockholders. 
without requiring them to provide any further information in addition 
to this? It is conceivable that incentives for truthful exhaustive 
reporting might be available. while incentives for summary reporting 
were not. In this case arguments against the efficiency of disclosure 
laws would need to be based on some sort of detailed cost-benefit 
calculations. rather than on any simple premise about sufficiency and 
accuracy of information provided under laissez-fare. 
It will be shown in the succeeding sections of this paper that 
to substitute summary reporting for complete reporting will 
dramatically increase the complexity and delicacy of the incentive 
problem for a large class of agents' preferences. This result may 
initially seem paradoxical. since it is natural to view complete 
reporting as asking the agent to do more than summary reporting does. 
However. reflection on the example of managerial reporting will 
illustrate the phenomenon that additional detail in reporting provides 
opportunity for increased flexibility in incentive design. Suppose 
that the annual report to stockholders contains an accounting 
statement of current profits and also a projection of ne�t year's 
profits. If investors are certain that these two summary numbers 
acurately reflect the information of the manager. they may not care 
how current revenue has been allocated between operating expenses, 
depreciation and profit. Nevertheless. even though they do not need 
to use this breakdown in order to make their own portfolio decisions, 
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owners might find it valuable because it could enable them to deter 
the manager from overstating profits.4 Even if they cannot verify the 
disaggregated information directly, they may yet find it a useful 
basis on which to condition the manager's compensation. This insight 
explains the marked contrast between the results now to be stated.5 
3 .  STATEMENT OF THE MAIN RESULTS 
We first describe the formal theory in which results are to be 
formulated: Let S be a set of states, A be a set of actions, and T be 
a set of transfers. These sets will be considered as open subsets of 
Euclidean spaces of dimensions k, m and n, respectively. (In greater 
generality, they could be smooth manifolds (cf. [1,Def.I.1 .6]) of 
those dimensions.) :m. denotes the real numbers. 
The state represents the private information of a person with 
utility function u:S X T � :m.. Note that the person's action does 
not enter � into his utility function. U will denote the set of 
utility functions which are smooth (i.e., infinitely differentiable) 
everywhere on S X T. If n > 1, then a transfer will be a consumption 
bundle which may include several different commodities. Alternatively 
u might be interpreted as an indirect utility function, and a transfer 
might be taken to be a budget (i.e., a price-income pair) made 
available to the person. 
A decision rule is a smooth mapping d:S � A. The 
interpretation of the rule d is that the person would choose action 
d(s) in each state s. D will denote the set of decision rules. 
A reward schedule is a smooth mapping r:A � T. The 
interpretation of the schedule r is that the person will receive 
transfer r(a) (from some donor not explicitly represented in the 
model) if he chooses action a. R will denote the set of reward 
schedules. 
Reward schedule r strictly supports decision rule d for 
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utility function u at state s if, for all states s in some 
neighborhood V of -; , d(s) is the unique action a in A which maximizes 
u(s,r(a)) .  This condition is stronger than (the local version of) the 
usual criterion of when a reward shcedule implements a decision rule, 
because of the uniqueness requirement. This requirement is made 
because (since the person's action is not an argument of his utility 
function) the trivial reward schedule which assigns a constant 
transfer regardless of the person's action would otherwise implement 
every decision rule for every preference. In the applied literature 
on incentive problems, reward schedules which strictly support 
decision rules (rather than which merely implement them in the weaker 
sense) are virtually always sought. 
Decision rule d is strictly supportable for utility function u 
at state s if some reward schedule in R strictly supports d for u at 
s. Strict supportability suggests that the giver of incentives must 
solve a local problem, but that the decision-maker whome the 
incentives affect is solving a global problem of optimization. The 
local problem of the incentive-giver has an intuitive interpretation: 
It is that, if the incentive-giver had sufficiently precise 
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information that the true state was close to s, then he would be able 
to strictly support the decision rule relative to the set of states 
not excluded by this information. 
Truthful reporting is now defined. It is assumed that there 
is a smooth embedding d. :s � A  in D. (cf. [2, Def. I.2.3) Note that 
this assumption implies k i m.) The action d•(s) will be regarded as 
a report of state s, so that d• defines truthful reporting as a 
decision rule. 
The feature of d• which will be crucial for the results of 
this paper is that it is an immersion at each state. (I. e. , its 
Jacobian has rank k at each state.) For any decision rule d, let I(d) 
be the set of states at which d is an immersion. Theorem 1 states 
that, at a state where it is an immersion and under the assumption 
that the space of transfers has sufficiently high dimension. a decision 
rule is locally strictly supportable for utility functions which are 
strictly concave in transfers, which have a most preferred transfer at 
the state in question, and which exhibit the greatest possible 
. ' 
interaction between preferences among states and among transfers. 
Theorem 1: If s e l{d) and either k = min or else both k < m and 
k < n, and if utility function u satisfies 
At every s and t, �{s,t) is negative definite, 
For some t e T, u (s,t) 
�S{;,t) has rank k. 






then there is a decision rule with r (s) = t which strictly supports d 
for u at s. In particular, under either dimensionality assumption, 
the theorem applies to truthful and complete reporting (decision rule 
d.). 
When S and A have dimension one, and T is two-dimensional 
(e. g. ,  transfers are combinations of a premium level and a level of 
self insurance, or of a wage and a required level of schooling, etc.), 
then Theorem 1 bears close relation to a standard technique for 
constructing reward schedules which strictly support various decision 
rules arising in applied incentive problems : For any t at which 
�(;,t) is no11Zero, define X to be the intersection of T with the line 
perpendicular to this vector (or more generally, to be a one-
dimensional smooth manifold containing t, at which point the tangent 
is perpendiular to �(;,t), e. g • •  the zero-profit locus for a 
competitive incentive giver). Then the assumptions of Theorem 1 are 
satisfied with respect to X as the space of transfers, so a decision 
rule d with no11Zero derivative at s is locally strictly supportable at 
s. The proof of Theorem 1 will generalize the familiar method of 
finding a reward schedule r which accomplishes this by expressing r as 
the solution of a differential equation with initial condition 
t = r{d {s)). What is most noteworthy about this method is that, in 
practice, there is no restriction on which transfers may be chosen to 
define the initial condition. The economic intuition which explains 
this phenomenon is that the sufficient condition for local strict 
supportability is stated in terms of opport unity costs of performing 
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alternative actions, and that varying the initial condition merely 
changes the base from which opportunity costs are calculated. Theorem 
2 asserts that this intuition is good in higher dimensions as well, as 
long as the decision rule is an immersion. 
Formally, if T(d,s,u) denotes the set of transfers t such that 
there exists a reward schedule r which locally strictly supports d for 
u at s and which satisfies r(d (s)) : t, then it is typical to find 
that T(d •• �. u) : T for incentive problem obtained when the applied 
problem in question is reformulated in terms of the revelation 
principle. Formally, what it will mean for a phenomenon to be 
typical is that it should occur with respect to all utility functions 
in some subset of U having nonempty interior in the Whitney CJ­
topology. 6 This is actually a rather fine topology, so Theorem 2 is 
not particularly strong, but the fineness of this topology will make 
more forceful the negative result to be stated in Theorem 3.  
Theorem 2: If s e l (d) and either k m � n-1 or else both k < m and 
k < n-1, and if the utility function u satisfies 
At every s and t, �(s, t) is negative definite, and 
At every t, the matrix [�(s, t),�S (s, t)] has rank k + 1. 
then T (d,s, u) : T. The set of all utility functions satisfying (4) 
and (5) has nonempty interior in the Whitney CJ- topology on U. 
A less restrictive condition than being an imn1ersion at a 
(4) 
(5) 
point is to be a local submersion. The smooth decision rule d :S � A 
is a local submersion at s if there i so· e neighborhood V of s such 
that the rank of the Jacobian matrix of d at s is the maximum of its 
rank at any point in V, and is at least one. 7 L(d) will denote the 
subset of S consisting of points where d is a local submersion. If 
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s e L (d), then the implicit function theorem may be applied to d at s. 
l(d) !!;;; L(d) by (2, Prop. I.2.10) . Theorem 3 asserts that the incentive 
properties of a decision rule d at states in L(d)\l(d) are enormously 
more fragile than at states in l(d). In particular, the property 
guaranteed on l(d) by Theorem 2 is asserted by Theorem 3 to fail in a 
spectacular way. 
Theorem 3 :  Let s e L (d)\l (d). Then the set of utility functions u, 
for which the complement of T(d,s,u) contains a residual subset of T, 
contains a subset which is residual in U in the Whitney CJ- topology. 
Since both T and U possess the Baire property, the set of utility 
functions u for which T(d,s,u) contains a nonempty open subset of T 
has empty interior in U. 
Remark 5: Suppose that j < k, and consider summary reporting 
of the first j coordinates of s (i. e • •  d (s): Cs1, • • •  , sj, 0, • • •  ,0)') as 
a decision rule. Then L (d) : S, so Theorem 3 applies to summary 
reporting at every state. 
Remark 6 :  Theorem 3 extends easily to situations in which the 
action taken is an argument of the utility function. (I. e. ,  
u:S X AXT � m..) In this case, define TA: AXT and define 
RA: {r :A � TA I a t r(a) : (a, t)}. That is, RA is the set of reward 
functions which dictate that the person will experience the direct 
consequences of the action taken as well as receiving a transfer. 
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Since RA is a subset of the set of all smooth functions from A to TA' 
and since the domain of u may be regarded as S X TA' Theorem 3 holds 
in this setting. 
Once again, consider the contrast between the economic 
implications of Theorems 2 and 3. Assume that firms ' profit 
distributions belong to a two-parameter family. Consider a firm which 
is confidently (but not with absolute certainty) believed ex ante by 
its shareholders to earn an e:z:pected profit P distributed with 
variance V, and suppose that the shareholders wish to pay a market­
determined compensation C to the manager if P and V do in fact 
characterize the statistical distribution of prof its and that they 
also desire to induce the manager truthfully to report the profit 
distribution. If the manager's preferences satisfy (4) and (5), then 
by Theorem 2 the shareholders ' two objectives can be simultaneously 
attained. (At least, in the sense of local strict support. Formally, 
S is the set of possible P-V combinations, A is a copy of S and the 
decision rule is the identity mapping, and T might (in order to have 
dimension 2 as required for tho theorem to apply) be a set of 
randomized compensations � for instance, combinations of a certain 
salary and a stock option, the value of which will be affected by 
random market fluctuations.) Now suppose that the manager receives a 
bequest B, which would be represented as a constant function from A to 
T which is added to w·hatever reward schedule the shareholders offer. 
(I.e., if he gives report (P',V '), the manager receives r(P ',V ') + B.) 
Except under the restrictive assumption that the manager has constant 
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absolute risk aversion, the reward schedule initially offered by the 
shareholders would presumably no longer elicit truthful revelation. 
However, again by Theorem 2, the shareholders could offer a new reward 
schedule which would still provide compensation C (and hence gross 
reward C + B) for giving report (P, V) and which would locally strictly 
support truthful reporting in the presence of the bequest. 
In contrast, consider the situation which is identical except 
that the shareholders desire only a summary report of the 
statistically expected prof it rather than an exhaustive report of the 
profit distribution. Now, by Theorem 3, for most utility functions 
satisfying (4) and (5) (i.e., on the intersection of the set of such 
functions with a residual set) there are arbitrarily small bequests 
(i.e., combinations of a sum of money and a stock portfolio) which 
will make it impossible for the shareholders to pay the market­
determined compensation in the event that their prior assessment of 
the profit distribution is correct and yet locally strictly to support 
truthful summary revelation by the manager of the expected profit 
level. Because of its extreme sensitivity to these wealth effects, 
the local strict support of truthful summary reporting would seem to 
be practically unattainable. 
It is a consequence of Lemma 2 (to be stated below) that, for 
any decision rule d, L(d) and the set of states at which d is locally 
constant jointly comprise a dense open subset of S. For the sake of 
completeness, the incentive characteristics of d on the latter set are 
now described. 
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Theorem 4: If d is constant on a neighborhood of s, then T(d,-;,u) 
for all utility functions u in a Whitney c2-open subset of U. 
T 
4 • PROOFS OF THEORDIS 1, 2 AND 4 
To begin, some notation regarding vectors and derivatives of 
functions will be defined. �will denote the origin of E.h. Vectors
will be colJllllns, and z' will de��te the transpose of z. Superscripts 
will denote coordinate projections of a function with multidimensional 
range. (E.g., if f:Z � JR. h, then f = <r , ...  ,fh)' and fi:Z � JR. for 
ii h,) Subscripts will denote partial derivatives. (E.g., if 
z � E.j and ii j, then f.(-;) = <-a
a r1c-;>. . . •• -a
a fh(-;)) '.) A 
1 z. z. 
1 1 
capital letter denoting a space, used as a subscript, will denote the 
matrix of partial derivatives with respect to coordinates in that 
space, The derivative of a scalar function will be a column vector 
(e. g., us(s,t) = (u1(s,t),,,.,�(s,t))'), and the derivative of a
vector function will be a matrix, the columns of which are derivatives 
with respect to coordinates (e.g., 
UST(s,t) = [vk+l(s,t), • • • •  vk+n(s,t)], where v(s,t) = us(s,t)),
The implicit function theorem will be used in the following 
form: 
Lemma 1 [2, Theorem I.2 .4): Let W !;; ll h and Y !;; ll j be open sots, and
suppose that f:W X Y -7 m) is smooth, f(;;,y) = 0, and fy(;,y) is 
nonsingular. Then there is a neighborhood V of w and there is a 
smooth function g:V � Y such that f(w,g(w)) = 0 for every w e V. 
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Furthermore, 8w(w) has the same rank as fw(w,g(w)).
Another lemma which will be used repeatedly is stated now as 
well. 
h .Lemma 2 [8 , Thm 3 .13 .l, Thm 3 .13 .2]: Let W � E. and Y !;;;; E. l be open, 
and let f:W � Y be smooth, Then at each w, 
fvlrank fW( v) 2 rank fw(w)} is a neighborhood of w. If there is some
neighborhood V of w such that rank fW(w) =max rank fw(v), then thereveV 
is a submanifold Z of Y which contains f(w), which has dimension equal 
to rank fW(w), and such that f maps a neighborhood of w onto z. 
Now the proof of Theorem 1 is begun, The idea is first to 
define a reward schedule on a set of actions which the decision rule 
prescribes in states close to s, and then to extend the domain of 
definition to all of A in a way which preserves the incentive 
properties of the subschedule. 
Lemma 3: If u satisfies (1), (2) and (3), then there is a 
neighborhood V of -; and an embedding b :V � T such that 
Proof: 
Vs e V u (s,b(s)) 
In Lemma 1, take W = S, Y = T, 
max u (s,t) 
teT 
and f = �·
because, by (1), fT is nonsingular at every (s,t),
Lemma 1 applies 
By (2), 
f(-;,t) = �(;,t) = �). Define b (-;) = t and b (s) = g (s), where g is
the function asserted to exist by Lemma l, By the concluding 
(6) 
statement of Lemma 1, b8(s) has the same rank as �S(s,b (s)) at every
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s in the domain of b. Thus. by (3) and Lemma 2. the restriction of b 
to some neighborhood of s is an immersion. By [2, Prop.I.2.10), there
is a neighborhood V of s such that b is a diffeomorphism from V to 
b(V), which is a submanifold of T. I.e • •  the restriction of b to V is 
an embedding. For simplicity. V will be regarded as the domain of b. 
It remains to show (6). By (1), u(s. t) is a strictly concave 
function of t for every s. Thus the first-order necessary condition 
for b(s) to maximize u(s. t) is in fact sufficient. This condition is 
precisely that �(s,b(s)) = Q.. which is assured by construction
of b. Q.E.D. 
Lemma 4: If s e l(d) and u satisfies (1). (2) and (3). then there is
a k-dimensional submanifold W of A from which there is an embedding 
r:W -7 b(V) (where b(V) is the submanifold of T constructed in Lemma 
- -1 3) such that d(s) e W. W � d(S). d (W) � v. and
Vs e d-1(W) u(s. r(d(s))) =max u(s,r(a)).
aeW 
�: Since s e l(d). there is a neighborhood of S contained in V
whose image under d is a submanifold W of A and from which d is a 
diffeomorphism to W. For simplicity. it will be assumed that 
(7) 
V = d-1(W). That V and W are diffeomorphic under d follows from Lemma
2 and [2, Prop.I.2.10). Then (7) holds if r:W -7 b(V) is defined by 
r = bd-1• by (6). and r is a diffeomorphism since it is a composition
of diffeomorphisms. Q.E.D. 
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Lemma 5: If k =mi n or if k < m and k < n, and also s e l(d) and u 
satisfies (1). (2) and (3). then there exist a neighborhood Z of d(s)
in W and a neighborhood Y of d(s) in A and a smooth mapping r:Y °' T 
such that Z t: Y and 
Vs e d-1(Z) u(s,r(d(s))) = max u(s,r(a)).
aeY 
( 8) 
and such that d(s) is the unique maximizing action if s e Zn d-l(Y).
Proof: If k = m i n, then W can be taken to be both the neighborhood 
Z and the neighborhood Y. and (7) is equivalent to (8). 
Now suppose that k < m and k < n. It is sufficient to extend 
the function r of Lemma 4 from a neighborhood Z of d(s) in W to a
neighborhood Y of d(s) in A with Z t: Y. taking care so that a I Z
implies r(a) j r(Z). This feature of the extension, along with the
strict concavity of u in t. will assure uniqueness on d-l(Z) of the
maximizing action. 
Since W is a k-dimensional submanif old of A. there exist a 
neighborhood E of d(s) in A and an immersion e:E -7 :mm which maps E
diffeomorphically to its range and such that e(d(s)) = Q. and
W n E = {e-1<x> I Yi > k x.. = OJ. Since b(V) is a k-dimensional1 
submanifold of T. there exist a neighborhood F of r(d(s)) in T and an
immersion f:F °' lR n which maps F diffeomorphically to its range and 
such that f(r(d(s))) = Q. and b(V) n F = {f-l( y) j Vj > k yj = O}. 
Define C = En r-lf-l(F). Note that C is a neighborhood of d(s) in W. 
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Now define the projection p:lRm -7 lRm by p(x) = (x1, . . .  ,�.o • . . .  ,O) ', 
-1 n ...1 -1 k -1 and define c:p e(C) -7 1R by c (x) = (t-re p (x). • • •  , f  re p (x),
f' x�,0, • • •  ,0)'. Finally, define Y = e-lc-1(F) and Z = W 0 Y, and
i='£+1 1 
extend r from Z to Y by defining r(a) = f-1ce (a). Note that
r-1r(Z) = Z, which is sufficient for (8) to hold.
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Theorem 1: Let u satisfy (1), (2) and (3), and let r be the 
neighborhood of d (;) and the mapping from Y to T described in Lemma 5. 
Choose a >  0 sufficiently small so that la - d (;> I < 2 a => a a Y, and 
define Z = {al la - d (;> I <a). A mapping q:A -7 T will be 
constructed such that q(a) = r(a) for a a Z, and such that q(a) I r(Z)
for a J z. Thus q will strictly support d at ; because, by (8), d(s)
is the unique action which maximizes u(s, q(a)) for s a d-1(Z). The
reward schedule q will be constructed by first constructing a smooth 
function h:JRm -7 m.m which is equal to the identity mapping on Z and
which maps :R m\Z to Y\Z. Then q may be defined by q(a) = rh(a).
Thus it is sufficient to construct h. Begin with a smooth 
mapping g:JR -7 [0,1] such that g (J3) = 1 for J3 � a and g(J3) = 0 for 
J3 L 2a. Such a mapping exists by [2, Cor.I.4.7]. In terms of this 
mapping, h may be defined by 
h(x) 
lx-d (;>I 
_ _ _ 
<J g(j3)dP/lx - d (s>l><x - d (s)) + d(s).0 
Note that lh(x) - d (;) I < 2a. for all x a JRm, so that h:lRm -7 Y, and
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that the coefficient of (x - d (i> > in the definition is 1 if x a Z and 
is at least a/Ix - d (s)I if x J Z. Q.E.D 
Proof of Theorem 2: Suppose that u satisfies (4) and (5), and 
consider any transfer t. By ( 5), �(;,t) � O. Thus there is a unique
hyperplane X in :Rn which contains t and to which �(-;, t) is a normal
vector. Let v:S X X -7 JR be the restriction of u to S X X. Now 
Theorem 1 applies to v, with X = T and t t, so there exists a reward 
schedule r:A -7 X which locally supports d for v at s. Since u and v 
coincide at every pair (s, r(a)), r locally supports d for u at s as 
well. 
It may be verified in a straightforward way that the subset of 
U on which (4) and (5) are satisfied is open in the Whitney c2 
topology. This set is nonempty, since it contains the function 
defined by u(s, t) = -[ t exp (s. + t.) + f exp (t.)].
1=1 1 1 i='i"+l 1 
Q.E. D. 
Proof of Theorem 4: Suppose that d (s) a for all states s in some 
neighborhood W ofs. Let X be the set of utility functions u such 
that, for all t = T, �(";',t) � Q. X is clearly nonempty, and it is
routinely shown that X is open in the Whitney c2 topology on U. 
Suppose that u a X, and choose a transfer t. It is sufficient 
to construct a reward schedule q which strictly supports d for u at s 
and which satisfies r(-;) t. By continuity of �· there are 
neighborhoods Y of s and Z of t such that (�(s, t))'(�(-;,t)) > 0 for 
s a Y and t a z. It may be assumed without loss of generality that 
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Y CW. Choose a positive constant a sufficiently small that a ball of 
radius aj�{;,t)j centered at t is contained in Z. Now define
h:A �JR by 
- - - - -1 h(a) = ((a - a) '(a - a))((a - a)')(a - a) + 1) 
and define a reward schedule r by 
r(a) = t - ah{a)�{;,t)
A path integration shows that r strictly supports d for u on Y.
Q.E.D. 
S • PROOF OF THEOREM 3 
The idea behind this proof is simple. If s s L(d)\l(d), then 
s lies on a manifold in S along which d is constant. If r strictly 
supports d for u at s, then d(s) must satisfy the first-order
condition for maximization of u not only at s, but everywhere on some 
interval of the path. This first-order condition is that 
�(s,r{d(s)))'rA{d(s)) O. The first-order condition implies that
�(s,d(;}) is orthogonal to the columns of rA(d(;}) for every state s
on the manifold where d(s) = d(;). If rA(d(;)) could be assured to be
nonzero, then the condition would constrain �(s,d(;}) to map the
constant manifold of d into a lower- dimensional submanifold of lR
n,
and this constraint is obviously very restrictive. The technical 
problems in the proof are to show that the constraint is binding even 
if rA(d(;)) = Q. and to establish a precise topological criterion for
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how restrictive it really is. 
Let d such that s e L{d)\l(d) be given. By Lemma 2, d maps a 
neighborhood of s surjectively to a submanifold of A. There are 
coordinate systems on neighborhoods of s and d(s) which permit d to be 
treated as a linear mapping: 
Lemma 6: Suppose that s e L(d) and that rank d8(;) j. Define
n:m.t � m.m by ·r(s) = (s1, • • •  ,sj'0, • • •  ,0)'. Then there are
coordinate systems on a neighborhood Y of s and on a neighborhood Z of 
d(s) in A such that, when d is expressed in these coordinates, 
d = 11 on Y. 
Proof: This is a consequence of [2, Cor.I.2.6] and [2, Defn.I.2.7]. 
The application of [2, Cor.I.2.6] is justified by 
Lemma 2. Q.E.D. 
From now on, Y and Z will be referred to by the coordinates 
described in Lemma 6. Furthermore it will be assumed that s= Q. e JRt
and that Y = (-1,l)t. It should be clear that no generality will be 
lost by this. Define a mapping y:(-1,1)
2 � Y by y(a,�) 
(a,O, • • •  ,O,p)•. In particular, y(0,0) = s. Define w(p) y( 0 ,ti). 
Also, for each positive integer h, define Ih = [0,h
-11.
Lemma 7: If s s L(d) and r strictly supports d for u at s, then for 
every h there exists� e Ih such that r1(d(y(ah,0))) I Q. 
Proof: If r strictly supports d for u at s, then 
- -1 -u(s,r(d(y(h ,0)))) ( u(s,r(d(y(0,0)))). This implies that 
r(d(y(h-1,0))) F r(d(y(0,0))). By the fundamental theorem of
-1 calculus, r(d(y(h ,0))) - r(d(y(0,0))) = 
h-1 h-1f rA(d(y(a,O)))dS(y(a,O))y1(a,O)da = f r1(d(y(a,O)))da.0 0 
last equality is because, by choice of coordinates, 
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(This 
dS( y(a,0))y1Ca,0) = (1,0, • • •  ,0)'.) In order for the difference to be
nonzero, r1(d(y(a,0))) F Q for some a e Ih. Q.E.D. 
yields (7). Q.E.D. 
Lemma 8 :  If s e L(d)\l(d) and t a T(d,s,u), then there exist a 
positive integer j and a vector c on the unit sphere c of It n such
that, for � e I., J 
�(w(p),t)'c = O. 
�: Suppose that r strictly supports d for u at s and that
(9) 
r(;) = t. Then j may be chosen so that r strictly supports d for u at 
every state in I�. The first-order condition for u(y(ah,p),r(a)) to
attain its maximum at d(y(ah,p)) = a implies that
�(y(ah,p),r(d(y(ah'�))))r1(d(y(ah'�))) = O. (10) 
Since d(y(ah,p)) = d(y(ah,0)), (10) is equivalent to
�(y(ah,p),r(d(y(ah,0))))•r1Cd(y(ah,0))) = O. (11) 
By assumption, then, (11) holds for h 2 j and � e Ij. By Lemma 7 , 
lr1(d(y(ah,O)))l
-1r1(d(yah,0))) is a well defined element of C, and 
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because C is compact it may be assumed without loss of generality that 
these vectors converge to a unit vector c as h tends to infinity. 
Taking the limit of (11) as h increases yields (9) . Q.E.D. 
Lemma 9: If t e T(d,s,u), then there is a positive integer h such 
that the vectors �(w(ih
-l),t) are linearly dependent for 1 � i � n.
�: By Lemma 8 ,  j and c can be selected so that (9) holds. Then,
if h = n-1j, the vectors �(w(ih
-1),t) must all lie in the (n - 1)­
dimensional subspace of 11.n orthogonal to c. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 3 :  Let Z be a countable dense subset of T. For every 
positive integer h and z in z, let �z be the set of utility functions
u for which the vectors �(w(ih
-1),z) are linearly independent for
1 ii � n. Define X to be the intersection of all of the �z (of which
there are only countably many). It is routinely established that each 
�z is a dense open set in the Whitney r?- topology on U, so X is a
residual set. Now it will be shown that, for each u in X, the 
complement of T(d,s,u) contains a subset which is residual in T. This 
fact establishes the theorem. 
Consider a utility function u which is in X. For every h 2 1 
and z e Z, let Yh be the set of transfers t such that the vectors
�(w(ih
-1),t) are linearly independent for 1 �i � n. it is routinely
established that yh is open in T. Furthermore, because u B xhz for
every z, Z C Yh. Therefore, if Y is defined to be the intersection of
the sets Yh, then Y is a residual subset of T. If t s Y, then the
vectors �(w(ih
-1),t) are linearly independent for 1 iii n, for every
positive h. Therefore, by Lemma 9. t J T(d.�.u). Q.E.D. 
6. Cctl'CLUSION 
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This paper has dealt in a preliminary fashion with a question 
about the practical significance of the revelation principle in the 
theory of incentives. This is the question of whether the reporting 
of private information to which the principle refers must literally be 
exhaustive or whether it is sufficient that summary information 
directly relevant (according to some reasonably strict standard of 
relevance) should be disclosed. The explicit results of the paper 
concern the decision problem of a single person facing an incentive 
schedule. rather than ref erring directly to the interrelated decision 
problems of several players in a game. Nonetheless. these results 
suggest that the distinction between complete reporting and summary 
reporting (or. more generally. between decision rules which are 
immersions and those which are not) should be taken very seriously. 
The principal result of the paper is Theorem 3 which asserts 
that. precisely because of the geometrical feature which makes it 
informationally efficient. the decentralizability of summary reporting 
will be at best an extremely fragile property for almost all utility 
functions. Only under stringent restrictions like separability of 
utility will it likely be practical. even when the incentive-giver has 
considerable knowledge. to strictly support summary reporting. It 
might be thought that this result shows that strict supportability is 
an extraordinarily demanding incentive criterion. but Theorem 1 shows 
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that exhaustive reporting will meet this criterion in a reasonably 
broad set of circumstances. Thus. the two results together suggest 
that decentralization of summary reporting rules may be much harder to 
achieve than is exhaustive reporting. In this case, in the presence 
of informational costs and constraints. the revelation principle can 
no longer be regarded as a universal and exact solution to the problem 
of decentralization. 
This paper has emphasized a negative result. Several avenues 
of research are now open which. if successful. would mitigate this 
result. One such avenue is the study of parametric restrictions on 
preferences which would insuxe the strict supportability (at least 
locally) of summary reporting rules. Certain ways of construing 
preferences over transfers as derived preferences (e.g •• if transfers 
are random variables. the assumption of expected-utility maximization) 
impose separability. so these may also have this favorable effect. 
Such restrictions describe sets of utility functions which are nowhere 
dense in u. but in many situations the restrictions have economic 
justification. 
A related avenue of research is the study of approximate 
supportability of decision rules. It is likely that, if summary 
reporting is strictly supportable for separable preferences. then 
reporting summary information about some state close to the true state 
is strictly supportable for a utility function which is (in some 
sense) nearly separable. Thus. even if restrictions on preferences 
cannot be assumed to hold exactly. they might be used to decentralize 
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rules which were at least approximately optimal. 
The suggestion just made implies that another avenue of 
research, neglected during the past few years, might profitably be 
reopened. If it is recognized that, in practice, incentive schemes d 
constructed via the revelation principle will be only approximately 
efficient, then the study of varions other ways to construct schemes 
designed only to achieve approximate efficiency is also a defensible 
enterprise. Such a study has been begun in [3]. 
• 
NOTES 
The advice of Kim Border, Donald Browu, and Chandra Kanodia is 
gratefully acknowledged. 
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1. Technically, the revelation principle applies to various
noncooperative equilibrium concepts which have the property that
persons' equilibrium actions are measurable with respect to the
information which they possess. Cf. Laffont and Maskin [7].
2. Besides this paper, there are three other recent papers which have
studied the interaction between communication requirements and
incentives. First, Stefan Reichelstein [4] shows that, for 
dominant-strategy or Bayesian Nash implementation of social choice
rules, the dimension of players' strategy spaces must be larger
than it would have to be if straightforward behavior could be
assumed. Second, simultaneously with the present work and
independently of it, Jerry R. Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont [4]
have derived analogues of the results presented here. Their work
is done in the context of a class of quasilinear utility
functions. Green and Laffont also investigate the question of how
large a space of rewards is needed to strictly support a decision
rule, and show that in general the reward space must have at least
as high a dimension as the action space has. Third, James Gerard
[l] has studied the issue of summary reporting in financial
markets, using a generalization of the model due to Steven Ross
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[10) as the basis for his work. In particular, the model concerns 
a fi:cm manager who is assumed directly to be. a risk-neutral income 
maximizer, rather than characterizing a decision maker's 
preferences indirectly by specifying preferences among reward 
schedules as in the present paper. Gerard shows that, within the 
parametric class of reward schedules considered by Ross, it is 
impossible to support strictly any one-dimensional decision rule 
which reveals the market value of a firm with a distribution of 
returns drawn from a two-parameter family. 
3. It has just been pointed out that important issues are obscured in
Ross's work by the assumption that decision-makers' private
information is of a particularly simple form (i. e., that it is one
dimensional). This observation is not meant to be a criticism
specific to Ross. The simplifying assumption that states are
somehow naturally ordered along a one-dimensional continuum is 
ubiquitous in the incentives literature. It has been used widely
in the study of insurance contracts, auctions, predation and limit 
pricing, and a variety of other situations. In each of these
applications, it involves what may be a considerable sacrifice of
realism. For instance, differences in risk aversion may be of
comparable importance to the differences in reservation price by
_which bidders' utilities are characterized in the usual model of
auctions. In order to take account of the possibility that these
characteristics of bidders may vary independently, a two­
dimensional state space is required.
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4. Of course, the comparison that is actually relevant is between the
firm's annual report to shareholders and its lOK report. The
complexity of reporting has been drastically understated in this
discussion, in the interest of simplicity.
S .  Several authors have established that, if information imperfectly 
correlated with a manager's conduct but provided independently of 
the manager is available without cost, then it is efficient to use 
it in determining his compensation. (Cf. B. Holmstrom [6] and the 
references given there.) That principle concerns the use of 
information in the statistical sense. I. e.,  the conditional 
distribution of the information, given the manager's conduct, is 
an exogenous feature of the environment. In contrast, the 
principle enunciated here concerns the use of a report about the 
content of which the manager will have complete discretion. In 
terms of a standard distinction in game theory .(cf. [5]), the 
former principle concerns questions of imperfect information while 
the present one concerns incomplete information. Thus, while they 
bear a strong superficial resemblance because they both consider 
changes in the basis on which rewards or penalties are assigned, 
the two principles are not closely related. 
6. The Whitney CJ- topology is formally defined and discussed in [2,
Sec. 11.3). Intuitively, this is the coarsest topology in which
every set of functions definable (in a continuous way) by
pointwise strict inequalities involving the graph of a function
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and its first and second derivatives. (E.g • •  the set of utility 
functions having nonsingular Hessian matrix at every point is 
open. since this condition is equivalent to the condition that the 
square of the determinant of the Hessian should be strictly 
positive at every point.) The sets asserted in this paper to be 
Whitney c2-open will evidently satisfy this intuitive criterion. 
so formal proofs of openness will be omitted. In any topological 
space. a set which is the intersection of countably many dense 
open sets is called residual. A space has the Bairo property if 
every residual sot is dense. Both :Rn under its usual topology 
and also U under tho Whitney c2 topology possess the Bairo 
property. 
7. A function is a submersion at a point if the rank. of its Jacobian 
matrix there is equal to the dimension of its range. Thus. if A 
is the regarded as the range of d. s e L(d) need not imply that d 
is a submersion at s (unless m 1). However. Lemma 2 below will 
assert that the restriction of d to some neighborhood of s is a 
submersion to a submanifold of A if s e L(d). 
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